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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE A. SI~IS, ~I. K. SIMS, 
EL~IER L. SI~IS and G. GRANT 
SI~IS, d/b/a SALT LAKE 
TRANSFER CO~[p ANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SER\TJCE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH and MAGNA-GAR-
FIELD TRUCK LINE, a corpora-
tion, 
Defendants. 
CASE No. 7377 
nn rEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
:--;TATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs above named are partners doing busi-
ness under the style of Salt Lake Tran.sfer Company 
and having a principal place of business at Salt Lake 
City, Utah and being engaged in transportation of com-
modities for hire over irregular routes within the State 
of Utah, both as a contract motor carrier and as a com-
mon motor carrier under authority issued by the Public 
Rervice Commission of Utah. 
The defendant, Public Service Commission of Utah, 
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is now and at all times herein Btated was a body cor-
porate created and existing by virtue of the laws of the 
State of Utah. The defendant Magna-Garfield Truck 
Line is a Utah corporation operating as a regular route 
common carrier between Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 
one hand, and on the other the communities of :l\Iagna 
and Garfield, serving certain intermediate points. 
On or about the lOth day of November, 1947 the 
plaintiffs above named filed an application (R. 1) with 
the Public Service Commission of Utah for a contract 
n1otor carrier permit to transport sugar in intrastate 
commerce between West Jordan, Utah and Salt Lake 
City, Utah. After due and legal notice of such hearing 
was given pursuant to the regulationt; of the Commis-
sion the matter came on regularly for hearing before 
the Commission on F'ebruary 5, 1948 at which time evi-
dence was adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs, as appli-
cants, of a contract between applicants and the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company of Salt Lake City, Utah to trans-
port sugar as a contract motor carrier between 'VP~t 
Jordan, Utah and Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 3) and the 
evidence therein adduced by witnesses representing the 
applicants and the said Sugar Company established, 
without contradiction, that the applicants had been en-
gaged continuously in the transportation of such Rugar 
between said points as a contract carrier for more than 
ten years next preceding the time of said hearing, (R. 
66, 80, 92) and that the said West Jordan, Utah plant 
is within a ten mile radius of Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 
141) 
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In opposition thereto the defendant, .Magna-Garfield 
Truek Line, as protestant, adduced evidence to show it 
wn~ regularly operating between Salt Lake City and 
the said point of \Yest Jordan and that it endeavored 
to serYe in the transportation of the said sugar. How-
ever, the representative of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
lmny testified that additional service such as that pro-
vided by the applicants was needed for the demands of 
their business in transporting sug-ar. (R. 92) 
The applicants further testified that they had on file 
the necessary insurance, (R. 7!1) complied with the reg-
ulations of the Commission (R. 80) had adequate trucks 
and equipment (R. 82) for rendering the proposed serv-
ice and that the addition or continuation of their service 
would not unduly burden the highway (R. 68) nor 
unduly interfere with the traveling public and that the 
granting of the application would not be detrimental to 
the best interests of the people of the State of Utah. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the defendant, Pub-
lic Service Commission of Utah, under date of July 1'9, 
1948 issued its Report and Order (R. 41) wherein it 
failed to make any finding whatsoever as to the estab-
liohed period of service by the applicants to the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company and denied the said application 
to operate as a contract motor carrier of sugar. 
On July 21, 1948 the plaintiffs herein, as applicants, 
executed and made a motion and application for rehear-
ing in said Case No. 3195, a copy of which has been 
separately filed herein, serving a copy thereof July 26, 
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1948 upon the defendant Magna-Garfield Truck Line, by 
mailing it to its attorney, and on the 27th day of July 
1948 filed the original and two copies of said applica-
tion and motion for rehearing with the Public Service 
Commission of Utah. Said motion is not made a part of 
the record filed by the Public :Service Commis.sion of 
Utah. 
Under date of July 31, 1948 the defendant, Magna-
Garfield Truck Line, through its attorney of record, 
executed, mailed and filed its ''brief in opposition to 
applicants' petition for rehearing and reconsideration" 
wherein it opposed the granting of the requested rehear-
ing. On or about the 15th day of April, 1949 the plain-
tiffs were advised by a representative of the Commission 
that the motion for rehearing was not in their files and 
could not after diligent search be located or found by 
them and thereupon on the 22d day of April, 1949 the 
plaintiffs re-filed with the Commission a duplicate copy 
of the said application and motion for rehearing, at-
tached hereto, said duplicate is a part of this record. 
(R. 45) 
On the 29th day of July, 1949 the defendant, Public 
Service Commission of Utah in said Case No. 3HI:l 
issued its Order (R. 48) denying the motion for rehear-
ing and reconsideration and mailed a copy thereof to the 
plaintiffs' attorney. 
The plaintiffs then filed with this court a Petition 
for Writ of Review on August 12, 1949 and a Writ wa.~ 
issued and a return made thereon. 
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1. The Public Service COinmission of Utah erred 
in its failure to make any findings regarding the contract 
motor carrier sE-rvice being rL·ndered by the plaintiffs 
to the Utah Idaho Sugar Company on January 1, 1940. 
2. The Public Service Commission of Utah erred 
in failing to grant to the plaintiffs authority to transport, 
as a contract motor carrier, sugar between West Jordan 
and Salt Lake City; Utah fo:r the Utah Idaho Sugar 
Company as a "grandfather" right. 
3. The Public Service Commission of Utah erred 
in finding that applicants failed to show that existing 
transportation facilities do not provide adequate ' or 
reasonable service as required by title 76-5-21~ Laws of 
Utah, 1945. 
4. The Public Service Commission of Utah erred 
in finding that the granting of this application would be 
detrimental to the best interests of the people in the 
area covered by the application. 
5. The Public Service Commission of Utah erred 
in finding that the granting of the authority to the plain-
tiffs would detract from the business of existing carriers 
which would eventually impair rather than improve 
transportation service and that there is sufficient serv-
ice already available in the area proposed to be served 
by plaintiffs. 
6. The Public Service Commission of Utah erred 
in denying the plaintiffs' application to so operate as a 
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contract motor carrier of sugar between West Jordan 
and Salt Lake City, Utah for and in behalf of Utah Idaho 
Sugar Company. 
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT PLAINTIFFS 
WERE CONDUCTING A LEGAL, EXEMPT CONTRACT 
CARRIER OPERATION ON JANUARY 1, 1940 AND ARE 
ENTITLED TO A PERMIT UNDER THE 1945 AMEND-
MENT TO TRANSPORT SUGAR BETWEEN WEST JORDAN 
AND SALT LAKE CITY. 
The Commission erred in failing to recognize or 
n1ake a finding on the fact that the applicant.s were con-
ducting a contract motor carrier service for transport-
ing sugar between West Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah 
for the Utah Idaho Sugar Company on and prior to 
tlanuary 1, 1940. The present law relating to contract 
motor carrier's authority is Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 
Annotated as amended by Laws of Utah 1945, Chapter 
105, to-wit: 
''It shall be unlawful for any contract motor 
carrier to operate as a carrier in intrastate com-
merce without having first obtained from the Com-
mission a permit therefor. The Commission shall 
grant on application to any applicant who was a 
contract motor carrier as defined by this act on 
the 1st day of January, 1940, a permit to operate 
as a contract motor carrier on the same highways 
and to carry on the same type of motor gerviee 
as he was on said date. 
"The Commission upon the filing of an appli-
cation for a contract motor carrier's permit -Hhall 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fix a time and place for hearing thereon and 11w~· 
give the same notice as provided in Section 
76-5-18 hereof. If, from all the te~timony offered 
at said hearing, the comn1ission ,._hall determine 
that the highways over which the applicant de-
~ires to operate are not unduly burdened; that 
the g-ranting of the application will not unduly 
interfere with the traveling public; and that the 
granting of the application will not be detrimental 
to the best interests of the people of the state of 
Utah and/or to the localities to be served, and if 
the existing transportation facilities do not pro-
vide adequate or reasonable service, the commis-
sion shall grant such permit." 
The first paragraph is the ''grandfather'' provision 
enacted to give recognition to existing legal operations 
which were altered by this H).!;) amendment. The law 
prior to such amendment contained the following excep-
tion from the requirement of a certificate or permit from 
the Commission, to-wit: 
76-5-25 (a) 
"No portion of this act shall apply: 
(a) To contract 1notor carriers of property 
when operating wholly within the limits of an 
incorporated city or town and for a distance of 
not exceeding fifteen road miles beyond the cor-
porate limits of the city or town in Utah in which 
the point of origin of any property or passenger 
movement is located or when operated within a 
radius of 15 miles from any point of origin out-
side of an incorporated city or town in Utah, and 
which movement either alone or in conjunction 
with another vehicle or vehicles is not a part of 
any journey or haul heyond said fifteen-mile 
limit;'' 
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Thus, prior to the _amendment of the statute, appli-
cants served the Utah Idaho Sugar Company plant as 
a contract motor carrier under the exemption, said plant 
at West Jordan being approximately 10 miles from Salt 
Lake City, Utah (R. 81). The evidence before the Com-
mission waB that the applicants proposed to carry on 
the same type of service as a contract carrier for sugar 
as they had been conducting for a number of years past. 
(R. 80, 92, 67). 
It is to be observed that in the wisdom of the Legis-
lature and in order to conform with the constitutional 
requirements, the "grandfather" provision referred to 
above was essential in the existing statutes so as to 
afford the shipping public a continuation of the services 
which they have utilized and found necessary or desi:r;-,. 
Ehle for the conduct of their business. It was not con-
templated that the transporters of commodities only 
during an emergency war period should be continued in 
force, but the Legislature looked back to the first day 
of January 1940 considering such to be a normal year of 
operation and said that those carriers who were then 
operating as contract motor carriers should, upon appli-
cation, be granted a permit to operate as a contract 
rnotor carrier on the same highways and to carry on th(• 
same type of motor service as was being performed on 
that date. The applicants in this proceeding comr 
squarely within the pervue of that statutory provision. 
This court in construing an earlier similar ''grand-
father'' statute, held in the case of McCarthy et al. vs. 
P.S.C.U. et al., 77 Pac. (2nd) 331, 94 Ut. 304 that eom-
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
peting conunon carriers would be entitled to notice of the 
time of hearing and pern1itted to appear in the proceed-
ing-~. In full con1pliance with this ruling the Commission 
p;nYe notice to the protestant, Magna-Garfield Truck 
Line. and a number of other carriers, as shown by the 
Affidavit of :J[ailing (R. 6), and it was in pursuance 
of ~uch notice that the :Jiag-na-Garfield Truck Line ap-
peared in opposition at the time of the hearing. Since 
the enactment of the 19-1;') statute, your Court had occa-
sion to construe the language thereof in the case of 
Rowley vs. Public Service Commission of Utah et al., 185 
Pac. (2nd) 514, ______ Utah ------· In that case, the applicant 
sought rather wide-spread authority to transport a va-
riet~- of commodities within the State of Utah. It was 
contended by the applicant in that matter that because 
he was conducting wide-spread service as of January 1, 
1940, that the Commission was bound to grant to him 
a permit to operate as a contract motor carrier over the 
named highways of this state. The record showed, appar-
ently without dispute, that the applicant, Rowley, had 
been carrying on said operations, not within any exemp-
tion under the statute, but b~- way of unlawful operation 
on the highways of Utah. Your Court in the Rowley case 
affirmed the order of the P.S.C.U. denying to ~fr. Row-
ley authority under the ''grandfather'' provision of Sec-
tion 76-5-21 referred to above because his operations as 
of January 1, 1940 were illegal operations. We shall 
quote from pages 519 and 520 of the Raid deciRion the 
following portions : 
Page 519: 
"(3) To interpret this act as contenrle(l for 
f) 
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by applicant would not only disregard sound pub-
lic policy; it would further disregard the ordinary 
concept of not permitting rights to be acquired 
by committing criminal acts against the state, and 
in the final analysis, it would result in the unique 
doctrine of the more flagrant the violation, the 
greater the rights acquired." 
Page 520: 
"If the legislature did not intend to place 
a stamp of approval on illegal operations, then 
what was the necessity or reason for the court's 
extending ''grandfather'' rights under the 1945 
act to legally operating carriers without extend-
ing them to operators not complying with the law~ 
The reason was that the deletion of sub-sections 
(a) and (i) of Section 76-5-25 broadened the stat-
ute and brought within the provisions of the act 
every contract carrier operating within cities and 
towns and also casual -contract carriers, which 
necessarily included a great many legally-oper-
ating carriers. 
''Many of these operators had substantial 
investments in the business and had acquired the 
privilege to operate with consent of the State. 
Considering the date used in the act, they had 
been· operating on the roads for at least five 
years, and it is reasonable to assume that there 
would be no necessity for them to establish the 
following facts: That their vehicles would not 
unduly burden the highways over which they had 
been operating; that their operations would not 
be detrimental to the best interests of the people 
of the state or the people of the localities served; 
that their trucks would not unduly interfere with 
the traveling public; and that their employment 
would not subject shippers to the hazards of deal-
ing with irresponsible carriers. It is further rea-
sonable to assume that their services were needed 
10 
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and desired. Had they not been, it is doubtful 
that the operations would have continued over a 
period of five years. 
'·''"'"ere it neressa ry for this court to deter-
mine why the legislature selected the ~Tear 1940, 
it could be determined logically and reasonably. 
Undoubtedly many opera tors were on the road in 
19-!5 due to the large movement of war .-;upplies. 
The record indicates a major portion of the haul-
ing done by the applicant was in transporting 
the~w items. Conditions did not lend themselve~ 
to adequate checking and supervising of vehicles 
on the highways. To grant privileges to those 
operators who, because of movements incidental 
to war. had established themselves in business 
after 1940 might be founding rights on false and 
temporary conditions that would not be fair and 
reasonable to the carrier who had established 
permanency and stability. It would not be an 
unreasonable classification to prefer those oper-
ators who had established themselves during nor-
mal times, and who had been in business long 
enough to indicate their capacity to operate and 
their ability to satisfy and protect the public." 
The applicants, Salt Lake Transfer Cmnpany, were 
already operating over the highways of Utah as of 
January 1, 1940 within the non-exempt areas as both a 
common carrier of commoditieR for hire pursuant to a 
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity issued by the 
Commission and affirmed by your court (R. 135) and 
as a contract motor carrier pursuant to a permit from 
the Commission (R. 71). As pointed out by Commis-
sioner Hacking (R. 75) the Salt Lake Transfer Com-
pany could have served West tTordan without any au-
thorit~v under the old law. The application before the 
11 
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Commission was on a regular printed form which waE 
utilized by the Commission both before and since the 
inception of the 1945 amendment whereby carriers ap-
plied to the Commission for contract carrier authority. 
It must be clearly held in mind that this is not a new 
movement of commodities which is being covered by this 
application, but rather it is merely a request that the 
Commission, pursuant to the 1945 statute, grant the 
contract motor carrier permit to carry on the same type 
of motor service on the same highways as the applicant 
was conducting, so far as the transportation of sugar is 
concerned, on and before January 1, 1940. 
The defendant herein and proteBtant before thr 
Commission, Magna-Garfield Truck Lines, through its 
counsel, has attempted to press for a construction of 
said 1945 statute so that the first paragraph referring 
to the "grandfather" rights is completely modified, 
limited and restricted by the second paragraph, which, 
according to the interpretation, logically placed upon it, 
refers to the procedure when a new applicant for con-
tract carrier service not heretofore provided to the public 
or to a contracting party ha3 been submitted for con-
sideration. Perhaps it is unfortunate that the legislature 
has embodied all of the procedure relating to contract 
carriers into a single section of the 1948 amendment. 
The legislature did take the precaution of segregating 
the ''grandfather'' rights by jncorporating the same in 
a separate paragraph. Then by the second paragraph 
of the said section the procedure was set forth for the 
CommisBion to follow in the event that a new contract 
carrier service is being proposed before the Commission. 
12 
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To hold otherwise would in psselH'l' nullify the purposes 
and the concept of the "grandfather" rights under a 
motor carrier or a public utility regulation statute. 
The applicants herein in good faith carried on their 
operations as a contract motor carrier with the Utah 
Idaho Sugar Company and though such operation was 
well known to the Commission, no steps were ever taken 
by the Commission to modify or change their operation 
until sometin1e subsequent to the enactment of the 1945 
amendment to the motor carrier act, (R. 84, 85) ; though 
temporary authority had been obtained from the Com-
mission for hauling sugar for this Company to points 
cutside of the exempt 15 mile radius, none has been 
requested or required within the said 15 mile radius 
of Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 85, 86). 
POINT 2. 
THE COMMISSION WAS BOUND BY THE UNDIS-
PUTED EVIDENCE TO GRANT TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
THEIR "GRANDFATHER" RIGHTS TO CONDUCT THE 
REQUESTED CONTRACT CARRIER OPERATION. 
For the reason set forth in the preceding argu-
ment No. 1, it is strenuously contended that the P.S.C.U. 
erred in failing to grant to the plaintiffs the requested 
authority to transport sugar between West Jordan and 
Salt Lake City, Utah as a contract motor carrier with 
the Utah Idaho Sugar Company under the said "grand-
father" right. We urge that all that was required of 
the applicant in said matter, under the 1945 amend1nent, 
was that they file an application with the Commission 
that proper notice thereof be given and that they show 
the contract relationship which Pxi.sted as of .January 
13 
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1, 1940, under which, service has been continuously ren-
dered since said date. The ancillary evidence of ability 
to perform adequate ·equipment and proper insurance as 
well as compliance with the regulations of the Commis-
sion have been clearly adduced in the record (R. 79, 80, 
82). 
May we point out the fallacy of modifying the 
''grandfather'' rights paragraph of Section 76-5-21, as 
amended, by the second paragraph which requires the 
Commission to determine, among other thing.s, that the 
highways are not unduly burdened and that the granting 
of the application will not unduly interfere with the 
traveling public, etc. The fact that the applicants are 
entitled to the "grandfather" authority is by virtue of 
the fact that they are already rendering to the public, 
over these same highways, the very service which they 
are seeking to be confirmed. Thus, the issue of unduly 
burdening the highway, interfering with the traveling 
public, etc. can not be properly considered as no addi-
tional burden or interference will result from the grant-
ing of the right to perform the same service as a con-
tract motor carrier on the .same highways. See: Rowley 
vs. Public Service Commission of Utah, supra. 
The record is replete with evidence that the appli-
cants have, pursuant to an oral contract with the Utah 
Idaho Sugar Co., conducted this same type of contract 
motor carrier service prio·r to and on January i, 1940 
and continuously since then over the same highways. 
Thus, the granting of a permit at this time to ronfirm 
the heretofore exempt operation, conducted in good faith 
by the applicants, could not possibly increaNe or rhangr 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the burden upon the highway~. Likewise the issue of 
whether the existing transportation facilities provide 
adequate or reasonable service is not material to the 
determination of "grandfather" rights as it is self evi-
dent that the continued serYice oYer the same highway.s 
for the san1e shipper for oYer ten years proves that the 
€xisting transportation facilitie~ do not provide adequate 
or reasonable service and hence such issue is not a 
proper part of the "grandfather'' rights section of the 
19-!5 1notor carrier act amendment. 
\Ye therefore respectfully urge that as to the 
"grandfather" rights of the applicants there is abso-
lutely no conflicting or contrary evidence adduced by 
the protestant or in any way a part of the record now 
hefore this court that would in any way deny that the 
applicants herein have for more than ten years last past 
continuously served in the transportation of sugar be-
tween West Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah for the 
Utah Idaho Sugar Company under a contractural agree-
ment between the parties. The recent reduction of said 
eontract to writing upon a form provided by the P.R.C.U. 
(R. 4), dated November 10, 1947, does not 1ninimize 
in any way the existence of an oral continuous contract-
ual relationship prior thereto. The existence of such 
relationship is confirmed in the record by the testimony 
of the applicants as well as the testimony of Mr. H. W. 
Ansell, general traffic manager for the Utah Idaho 
Rugar Co. (R. 92). 
POINT 3. 
IN ADDITION TO "GRANDFATHER" RIGHTS, PLAIN-
TIFFS PROVED ALL ESSENTIALS FOR GRANTING OF 
]f) 
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'l'HE REQUESTED CONTRACT CARRIER PERMIT TO 
TRANSPORT SUGAR. 
It is the position of the plaintiffs that the fir.st 
two errors set forth above are such that your court 
should reverse the Public Service Commission and order 
the granting of t,he requested authority by the plaintiffs. 
\Vithout waiving the basis for such a reversal predicated 
upon the ''grandfather'' rights of the plaintiffs as set 
forth in the brief thuB far, we shall discuss at this time 
errors No. 3, 4, 5 and 6 under this present argument. 
The plaintiffs, in addition to proving the ''grand-
father" rights heretofore discussed, put in evidence the 
festimony of the shipper whose interest is vitally con-
cerned in this matter. This is a contract carrier appli-
cation and it must be kept in mind that the element of 
public convenience and necessity which iB an essential 
of a common carrier application, is not at issue herein. 
It is true that the 1945 amendment to the law, and par-
ticularly under the second paragraph thereof, refers to 
the requirement that the Commission determine that the 
existing transportation facilitieR do not provide adequate 
or reasonable service. Mr. H. W. Ansell, general traffic 
manager for Utah Idaho Sugar Company, testified (R. 
87 to 112) and a review of his testimony clearly affirms 
that the plaintiffs were rendering a supplementary ~erv­
ice not provided by the existing transportation facilities. 
The plant at West Jordan was served by the rail-
road but the shortage of frBight cars and the difficult~· 
of procuring the same and having them moved from one 
location to another wholly eliminated the rail facilities 
for the movement of emergency shipments of sugar. 
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~Ir. 4-\.nsell te:-;tified that the defendant, l\lag·na-Oarfield 
Truck Lines and the plaintiff~ have had in force the same 
that they nsed the services of l\lagna-Garfield Truck 
Lines at frequent interYals, however his testimony was 
Yery clear that those existing facilities were inadequate. 
To quote in part (R. 90) · · \\~ e have found that when 
~ome exritement orcurs in the sugar businesB, which 
happens quite frequently, either through some rumor 
in the paper. or increase in priee, or removing of ration-
ing, or son1e other purpose. why there is a sudden de-
mand for sugar, and in that case, we have found that 
the :J[agna-Garfield Truck Lines can not meet our re-
quirements.'' The record clearly indicates that the plain-
tjffs have been and will be called upon to transport loadM 
of 100 bags or more being a 10,000 lb. or more truck 
load. Also the testimony was that the Magna-Garfield 
Truck Lines and the plaintiff have had in force the same 
rate of 10c per 100 for the moving of such loads. A 
higher rate exists on I. t.l. movements by Magna-Gar-
field but a much lower rail rate exists for moving the 
sugar. (R. 100) Despite vigorous cros.s-examination, 
:Jfr. Ansell did not deviate from his position that the 
service of the plaintiffs was very essential to their busi-
ness as the sugar busines.s is highly competitive and 
nny delays from whatever cause \vould result in the loss 
c;f a sale or other prospective business. The evidence 
vas further that no additional use of the facilities of 
Ralt Lake Tran.sfer Company would be made different 
from that utilized during the past ten years and that 
~aid movements would be restricted to a 10,000 lb. mini-
mum. (R. 111) 
17 
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We find absolutely nothing in the record upon which 
the Commission could have based a finding that the 
granting of the application would be detrimental to the 
best interests of the people in the area covered by the 
application. The only shipper involved and the only 
public witness present was Mr. Ansell who strongly 
urged the granting of the reque.sted authority. There 
is nothing in the record that would show that the service 
of the Magna-Garfield Truck Lines was in danger of 
diminution in the event that this authority should be 
granted. In fact, notwithstanding the use of the plain-
tiffs' trucks in emergencies from time to time during 
the past years, the Magna-Garfield Truck Line has in-
creased in the number of schedules and the number of 
truck units. 
The Magna-Garfield Truck Lines operates a sched-
uled service and use a limited number of trucks. The 
plaintiffs, Salt Lake Transfer, have over 100 trucks 
available and the testimony was that immediate service 
could be rendered and provided in the movement of 
loads of sugar from the West Jordan plant. We have 
spoken of "·emergency" hauls for the Utah Idaho Sugar 
Company. Though such phrase has been used the testi-
mony is clear that the so-called emergencies were fre-
quent enough so as to constitute a continued, though not 
daily demand for occasional service. Mr. Ansell affirm€'d 
the intention of the Utah Idaho Sugar Company to con-
tinue to utilize the services of the Magna-Garfield Truck 
Lines in approximately the same volume in the future 
2-.s had been used in the past and hence there is absolutely 
no basis for the Public Service Commission of Utah to 
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make a finding that the granting of the authorit~' would 
detract froin the business of the existing earrier or that 
it would eventually impair rather than improve trans-
r;ortation service, or that there is sufficient service 
alread~· available. 
The right of parties to eontract in good faith is a 
sacred right which should not be lightly cast aside. We 
recognize that in the interest of orderly procedure the 
Public Service COinmission of Utah has been granted 
certain powers over contractural relationships between 
a carrier of property for hire and citizens of the state. 
'Ve submit that such powers must be used judicially to 
the end that the needs of a large shipper of goods such 
as the Utah Idaho Sugar Company may be reasonably 
provided. "\V e desire to reaffirm to the court the reason-
ing set forth in the case of Rowley vs. Public Service 
Commission of Utah (Supra) wherein it was stated hy 
your court that: 
"Considering the date used in the act, they 
had been operating on the roads for at least five 
years, and it is reasonable to assume that there 
would be no necessity for them to establish the 
following facts: That their vehicles would not 
unduly burden the highways over which they had 
been operating; that their operations would not 
be detrimental to the best interests of the people> 
of the state or the people of the localities served~ 
that their trucks would not unduly interfere with 
the traveling public; and that their employment 
would not subject shippers to the hazards of 
dealing with irresponsible carriers. It L;; further 
reasonable to assume that their services were 
needed and desired. Had they not been, it i~ 
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doubtful that the operations would have continued 
over a period of five years.'' 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully submit that 
) our Honorable Court should enter an order directing 
that the Public Service Commission of Utah reverse 
its decision in the subject case and that the Commission 
be ordered to grant to the plaintiffs authority to trans-
port sugar for the Utah Idaho Sugar Company between 
West Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah as a contract 
motor carrier for hire and that a proper permit thereon 
be issued. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
Attorneys for Pla.intiffs 
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